

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA**

**BECKLEY DIVISION**

<b>ANTHONY KEVIN FIELDS,</b>	)	
	)	
<b>Petitioner,</b>	)	
<b>v.</b>	)	<b>Civil Action No. 5:15-09187</b>
	)	
<b>JOE COAKLEY, Warden, et al.,</b>	)	
	)	
<b>Respondents.</b>	)	

**PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION**

On July 2, 2015, Petitioner, acting *pro se* and formerly incarcerated at FCI Beckley, filed his Complaint in this matter for alleged violations of his constitutional and civil rights pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 24 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). (Document No. 1.) In his Complaint, Petitioner alleged that the BOP was improperly calculating his sentence.<sup>1</sup> (Id.) By Order entered on July 7, 2015, United States Magistrate Judge R. Clarke VanDervort construed Petitioner's Complaint as a Petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Document No. 3.) Judge VanDervort also ordered that Petitioner (1) amend his Petition to specifically set forth his grounds for *habeas* relief by July 21, 2015, and (2) either pay the \$5.00 filing fee or submit the appropriate Application to Proceed *in Forma Pauperis* by July 21, 2015. (Id.) Finally, Judge VanDervort notified Petitioner as follows:

Failure of the Plaintiff to (1) amend his Petition, and (2) either pay the filing fee or file an Application to Proceed *in Forma Pauperis* by July 21, 2015, will result in a recommendation of dismissal of this matter without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 41.1 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the Southern District of West Virginia.

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<sup>1</sup> Because Petitioner is acting *pro se*, the documents which he has filed are held to a less stringent standard than if they were prepared by a lawyer and therefore construed liberally. *See Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).

(Id.) By Order entered on January 6, 2016, the above case was referred to the undersigned for submission of proposed findings of fact and a recommendation for deposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (Document No. 6.) Petitioner has not responded to the Court's Order that was entered more than one year and one month ago. Accordingly, the undersigned has determined that Petitioner has failed to take any steps to prosecute this action, and therefore, Petitioner's Petition in this case should be dismissed.

### **ANALYSIS**

Pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 41.1 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the Southern District of West Virginia, District Courts possess the inherent power to dismiss an action for a *pro se* Petitioner's failure to prosecute *sua sponte*.<sup>1</sup> See Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1388, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962).

Rule 41.1 of the Local Rules provides:

**Dismissal of Actions.** When it appears in any pending civil action that the principal issues have been adjudicated or have become moot, or that the parties have shown no interest in further prosecution, the judicial officer may give notice to all counsel and unrepresented parties that the action will be dismissed 30 days after the date of the notice unless good cause for its retention on the docket is shown. In the absence of good cause shown within that period of time, the judicial officer may dismiss the action. The clerk shall transmit a copy of any order of dismissal to all counsel and unrepresented parties. This rule does not modify or affect provisions for dismissal of actions under FR Civ P 41 or any other authority.

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<sup>1</sup> Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

**(b) Involuntary Dismissal: Effect.** If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it. Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this rule - - except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19 - - operates as an adjudication on the merits.

Although the propriety of a dismissal “depends on the particular circumstances of the case,” in determining whether to dismiss a case involuntarily for want of prosecution, the District Court should consider the following four factors:

- (i) the degree of personal responsibility of the plaintiff;
- (ii) the amount of prejudice caused the defendant,
- (iii) the existence of a history of deliberately proceeding in a dilatory fashion, and
- (iv) the existence of a sanction less drastic than dismissal.

Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95 (4th Cir. 1989). In consideration of the first factor, the Court finds that the delays in this case are attributable solely to Petitioner as the Respondents have not been required to make an appearance in this action. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, federal courts may authorize the commencement of an inmate’s civil action *in forma pauperis* upon the inmate’s filing an Application to so proceed, together with an Affidavit stating the nature of the action and Petitioner’s belief that he is entitled to redress. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)(1) and (2) (2002). “Section 1915 is intended to allow qualified litigants to proceed without having to advance the fees and costs associated with litigation.” DeBlasio v. Gilmore, 315 F.3d 396, 398 (4th Cir. 2003). Petitioner has not responded to the Court’s Order directing him either to pay the requisite filing fee or to file an Application to Proceed *in Forma Pauperis*. (Document No. 3.) Petitioner, therefore, is the sole cause of the delays in this action. With respect to the second and third factors, the record is void of further evidence indicating that Petitioner has a history of “deliberately proceeding in a dilatory fashion” or that the Respondents have been prejudiced by the delays in this case.

In consideration of the fourth factor, the Court acknowledges that a dismissal under either Rule 41(b) or Local Rule 41.1 is a severe sanction against Petitioner that should not be invoked lightly. The particular circumstances of this case, however, do not warrant a lesser sanction. An assessment of fines, costs, or damages against Petitioner would be unjust in view of Petitioner’s

failure to pay the filing fee. Moreover, explicit warnings of dismissal would be ineffective in view of Petitioner's failure to respond to the undersigned's Order entered more than one year and one month ago advising Petitioner that the undersigned would recommend dismissal if Petitioner failed to complete and file the above forms (Document No. 3). In consideration of all factors, the undersigned concludes that dismissal for failure to prosecute is warranted. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that this action be dismissed without prejudice unless Petitioner is able to show good cause for his failure to prosecute.

### **PROPOSAL AND RECOMMENDATION**


The undersigned hereby respectfully **PROPOSES** that the District Court confirm and accept the foregoing findings and **RECOMMENDS**, that the District Court **DISMISS** Petitioner's § 2241 Applications (Document No. 1), and **REMOVE** this matter from the Court's docket.

The Petitioner is hereby notified that this "Proposed Findings and Recommendation" is hereby **FILED**, and a copy will be submitted to the Honorable United States District Judge Irene C. Berger. Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B), and Rule 6(d) and 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Petitioner shall have seventeen days (fourteen days, filing of objections and three days, mailing/service) from the date of filing of this Proposed Findings and Recommendation within which to file with the Clerk of this Court specific written objections identifying the portions of the Findings and Recommendation to which objection is made and the basis of such objection. Extension of this time period may be granted for good cause.

Failure to file written objections as set forth above shall constitute a waiver of *de novo* review by the District Court and a waiver of appellate review by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363 (4th Cir. 1989); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S. Ct. 466,

88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1208, 104 S. Ct. 2395, 81 L. Ed. 2d 352 (1984). Copies of such objections shall be served on opposing parties, District Judge Berger, and this Magistrate Judge.

Date: August 16, 2016.



Omar J. Aboulhosn  
United States Magistrate Judge